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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10000
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING OF OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 1964
DATE : 10/01/64
PAGES : 21
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 1964 MEETING
SUMMARY OF OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 1964 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/14/98~~ ~~08/01/2007~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
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MINUTES OF
BOARD MEETING
OF
OCTOBER 1 and 2, 1964

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR OCTOBER 1 and 2, 1964

October 1, 1964

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
1.	9:00 - 9:45	Chairman's Time
2.	9:45 - 10:15	<u>Major Board Recommendations - Status Report</u> Mr. Ash
3.	10:15 - 11:15	Audiosurveillance Collection and Counter-measures:
a.	10:15 - 10:30 10:45	<u>Final USIB Assessment of Audio Penetrations of U. S. Embassy, Moscow</u> Mr. Howard Osborn Director of Security, CIA, and Chairman of USIB's Security Committee Mr. Marvin Gentile <i>Keirn C. Brown</i> Director of Security, Department of State
b.	10:45 - 11:45 10:30 - 11:15	USIB Conclusions and Recommendations on Organization, Management and Coordination of the Effort Mr. Richard Helms <i>and [unclear]</i> Deputy Director/Plans, CIA Mr. Howard Osborn
4.	11:15 - 11:30 11:45	Executive Session
5.	11:30 - 12:15	Highlights of Soviet COSMOS (Photographic Reconnaissance Satellite) Efforts Targeted Against the United States <i>Dr. Albert Wheelon + [unclear]</i> Deputy Director for Science and Technology, CIA
6.	12:15 - 1:00	Lunch - White House Mess
7.	1:00 - 1:30	Recent Tonkin Gulf Incident:
a.	1:00 - 1:15 1:40	<u>General Highlights</u> Mr. Coyne
b.	1:15 - 1:30 2:10	<u>White House Intelligence Requirements in Developing Crisis Situations</u> Mr. Bromley Smith Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

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October 1, 1964 Agenda (Continued):

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
8.	1:30 - 4:30	Alert Warning and Response Capabilities of the U. S. Intelligence Community in Developing Crisis Situations (Organization and procedures for analysis of current intelligence; identification of Early Warning indicators; timely appraisal and reporting to top Government levels):
a.	1:30 2:10 - 1:50 3:20	National Security Agency Mr. Louis Grant + <i>Mr. Jack Sharretts</i>
b.	1:50 2:10 - 2:10 3:20	Department of Defense Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll + <i>Col.</i> Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
c.	2:10 - 2:30	Executive Session <i>not held</i>
d.	2:30 3:20 - 2:50 3:45	Department of State Mr. Thomas L. Hughes Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
e.	2:50 3:45 - 3:10 4:05	Central Intelligence Agency Mr. R. J. Smith Assistant Director, Current/Intelligence Staff
f.	3:10 - 3:30	Executive Session <i>not held</i>
g.	3:30 - 4:30 4:15 5:00	Organization, Procedures and Communications Support of the USIB Watch Committee and National Indications Center Mr. Huntington Sheldon Chairman, USIB Watch Committee
9.	4:30 - 5:00	Executive Session <i>not held</i>
10.	5:00 - 5:10	Application of Executive Pay Bill to Key Positions in the National Signals Intelligence Community Dr. William O. Baker Chairman of the Board's Communications Panel
11.	5:10 - End of Day	Resume Consideration of Item 2.
12.	7:30	Dinner at the Residence of Mr. Gordon Gray (Address: 1224 - 30th Street, Northwest)

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October 2, 1964

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
13.	9:00 - 9:45	Chairman's Time
14.	9:45 - 10:45 ^{11:00}	Current Intelligence Briefing on Situations in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Communist China, Malaysia-Indonesia, Cyprus, Congo, Cuba <u>Mr. Ray Cline & Mr. Clinton B. Conger</u> Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA (or Mr. R. J. Smith)
15.	10:45 - 11:00	Executive Session <i>not held</i>
16.	11:00 - 12:00 ^{12:15}	The National Reconnaissance Program <u>Dr. Brockway McMillan & Brig. Gen. Geo. J.</u> Director, National Reconnaissance Office
17.	12:00 - 12:15	Executive Session <i>not held</i>
18.	12:15 - 1:00	Lunch - White House Mess
19.	1:00 - 1:45 ^{1:10 1:50}	Briefing on Highlights of Recent U. S. National Photographic Intelligence Activities <u>Dr. Arthur Lundahl</u> Director, National Photographic Intelligence Center
20.	1:45 - 3:00	Discussions of Future Board Business
21.	3:00 - 4:30	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence <u>Mr. John A. McCone & Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick</u>
22.	4:30 - End of Day (5:00)	Executive Session

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

~~April 5, 1965~~

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting, October 1-2, 1964

October 1, 1964

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board convened at 9:00 AM on October 1, 1964 at the Board's offices in the Executive Office Building. Present were Chairman Clifford; Board members Langer, Pace, Gray, Land and Baker (Mr. Murphy was in Brazil); and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

In opening the meeting the Chairman pointed out that ample time had been allotted during this two-day meeting for Board members to discuss agenda items of special interest. He then turned to some matters which he wished to bring to the Board's attention before proceeding with the regular agenda.

Chairman Clifford informed Board members that since the last Board meeting he had met with the President a number of times for discussions of various subjects, and on these occasions had taken the opportunity to progressively acquaint the President with the work of the Board. Mr. Clifford pointed out to the Board that, unlike President Kennedy who had re-constituted the Board in 1961 and was thoroughly familiar with its functioning, President Johnson has not been as intimately associated with the Board, primarily for the reason that no intelligence-related incidents have thus far arisen in President Johnson's term to evidence his special need for the Board's assistance. However, during the past few months the President is beginning to get a better idea of the Board's accomplishments as a result of Mr. Clifford's comments from time to time. Chairman Clifford observed that otherwise it was unlikely that the President would learn much about the work done by the Board, and certainly not from the intelligence community itself and probably not from Mr. McGeorge Bundy whose many duties of a non-intelligence nature are most demanding.

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With a view to keeping the Board fully informed of the President's indicated reactions to Board's work, Mr. Clifford said that for the time being the President prefers a quiet, unostentatious operation of the Board. It is the President's desire to try to avoid any explosions in the intelligence field, and any resignations in heat by any members of the intelligence community. After coming into office under most difficult circumstances, the President has found people are eager to help, and he relies heavily on Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and on others such as the members of this Board.

Concerning contacts with the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Clifford said that he has talked with him from time to time. Recently, Mr. McCone had called to say that he was going to be out of the country on a mission, and he asked that General Carter of CIA be furnished the usual list of topics which Board members wished the DCI to cover during this meeting of the Board.

At this point the Chairman asked that the Board take up a matter in closed session, with Messrs. Ash and Coyne leaving the conference room and rejoining the meeting at the end of the closed session. Chairman Clifford informed Mr. Coyne that the Board had discussed a report and recommendation which Mr. Pace had prepared for the Board's consideration, and the Board had unanimously agreed to propose to the President that the position of Executive Secretary to the Board be placed in Level IV of the Executive Salary Schedule recently established by the Salary Reform Act. Mr. Clifford said that as a part of this proposal it would be suggested to the President that meanwhile the salary of the Executive Secretary be raised to a level commensurate with the compensation of positions classified in GS-18, pending Presidential action to place the position in Executive Level IV. Mr. Coyne expressed to the Board his appreciation for this action not only as it applied to him as incumbent of the position, but also as an action in keeping with the work and level of effectiveness required of the position in performing on behalf of the President and the Board the responsibilities involved.

The Board then recessed for a minute to greet former Board member General Doolittle who had visited the Board's offices to pay his respects to the members. (At the time of the visit, through arrangements made by Mr. Coyne, General Doolittle was debriefed by Mr. Henry Thomas of CIA in connection with the suspension of various special clearances held by General Doolittle at the time of his recent resignation from the Board.)

Resuming in executive session, the Chairman called attention to the next item on the regular agenda dealing with the audio-surveillance and countermeasures problem generally, and with the intelligence community's assessment of damage to the

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national security resulting from the 12-year penetration of the U. S. Embassy in Moscow through the Soviet microphone system which had recently been uncovered there. In this connection, Mr. Pace observed that the September 24, 1964 report which the Board had received from General Carter of CIA (concerning the status of actions taken in response to Board Recommendation No. 35 of June 1962) was not responsive to the Board's recommendation calling for the organization of a major research and development effort in the audiosurveillance field.

At 10:40 AM the Board meeting was joined by Messrs. Richard Helms, Karamessines and Harold Osborne of CIA, and Mr. Brown who represented the Director of Security of the State Department.

Chairman Clifford asked Mr. Osborne of CIA (Chairman of the USIB Security Committee) to speak to the intelligence community's damage assessment of the Soviet microphone penetration of the U. S. Embassy at Moscow.

Mr. Osborne read from a draft report on the damage assessment, which was scheduled to be considered by the USIB Security Committee on the following Tuesday preparatory to submission to the USIB. He noted that the 52-microphone system had been installed during the Soviet-controlled construction and renovation of the Embassy building prior to its occupation by the U. S. It was tentatively concluded that the penetration did serious damage to the U. S. which is not possible of precise proof. The penetration provided the Soviets at least with the knowledge of Embassy operations, especially those of the U. S. military attaches; knowledge of the Attaches' travel plans and intelligence targets in the USSR; and information on the habits, problems and weaknesses of Embassy personnel as a basis for possible exploitation by Soviet Intelligence Services. Mr. Osborne said that Ambassador Thompson has expressed the intention to give the Security Committee a damage assessment which is understood to reflect the judgment that the damage to U. S. political interests was not serious and could only have given the Soviets a short-run advantage.

Mr. Osborne said that the damage assessment has pointed up certain deficiencies which have long been recognized by U. S. security officers, namely: the fact that Soviet bloc control of U. S. embassies during construction periods prevents security inspections which would identify installations being made of clandestine listening systems; the U. S. does not have an effective technical capability to detect buried microphones; and there is a need for a stronger interagency mechanism to develop necessary countermeasures. He added that State now has a program to demolish at least one room in each U. S. Embassy located behind the Iron Curtain, and other U. S. agencies have been invited to join State in the conduct of "sweep" procedures.

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One action resulting from the Moscow incident has been the alerting of appropriate U. S. agencies to the type of installation uncovered in Moscow. The USIB will be asked to urge the agencies involved to seek adequate funds and personnel to perform necessary security inspections of facilities overseas. The agencies will be asked to monitor the U. S. personnel who were subject to compromise by Soviet technical penetrations, to ensure that Soviet exploitation attempts are not successfully made against them. It will be proposed that a new interagency mechanism for countermeasures coordination be established within the USIB, with a view to achieving such goals as U. S. observation of the construction of our overseas facilities; the employment of U. S. personnel rather than local maintenance personnel in the Embassys; the assignment of more U. S. technicians to security inspections of U. S. posts overseas; the assignment of resident U. S. security technicians at sensitive posts abroad; intensified security indoctrination and briefings of U. S. personnel scheduled for assignment abroad; and expanded research and development in the audiosurveillance countermeasures field.

Chairman Clifford asked whether the USIB Security Committee's assessment had produced actual showings that the Soviets had intercepted Embassy messages. (Mr. Clifford recalling the incident last year when Khrushchev boasted to Ambassadors Harriman and Kohler that he knew the contents of a message that Kohler had sent to Washington recommending against U. S. approval of a sale of West German pipe to the USSR.) Mr. Osborne could shed no light on this. Mr. Coyne stated that he had followed up with State Department several times regarding this incident but the Department never had come up with a meaningful report. Mr. Osborne said that Ambassador Thompson's forthcoming annex to the Security Committee's assessment was expected to go into the matter of whether the Soviets were known to have acted on any information which was obtained through the microphone penetration.

At Chairman Clifford's request, Mr. Helms spoke to the subject. He observed that CIA has over 300 telephone taps and many other listening devices operated world-wide. These operations not only are for intelligence collection, but they also provide CIA with an idea of the kind of countermeasures used by the opposition as, for example, in the case of the Chinese Communists' discovery of CIA's audiosurveillance operation directed against the Chinese in Geneva. Mr. Helms said that without audio coverage the CIA would not have known that Lee Harvey Oswald sought a visa at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in 1963. In Burundi, when a Chicom attache defected to the U.S. and asked for asylum, the Chicom Legation pressured the Burundi Government to attempt to seize the defector and return him to the Chicoms -- but CIA learned of this plan

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through audiosurveillance coverage and was able to thwart the Chicom and spirit the defector out of Burundi to the U. S.

In answer to Mr. Clifford's inquiry, Mr. Helms said that one major lesson learned from the Moscow penetration incident is simply that such penetrations are just being invited when the host country controls construction of the premises and supplies the maintenance employees.

Dr. Baker asked what was being done to protect the U. S. Embassy in Moscow and whether there are plans to use plastering and paint to cover walls such as those in which pin-hole apertures were found to lead to the concealed microphones. Mr. Brown of State said that he understood that research and development planning is being done on this. Dr. Baker observed that this is not an R and D problem and that such materials are available now for use in placing protective coatings on walls in our sensitive facilities abroad. Dr. Baker recalled that the code room is jeopardized in the U. S. Embassy in Paris where the Embassy is joined to a contiguous building not under our control, and Dr. Baker wanted to know what is being done about that situation. Mr. Brown of State was unable to say but he pointed out that current countermeasures plans are directed to the protection of U. S. posts in the Iron Curtain countries, not France.

Dr. Land said that there appeared to be some protective steps which could be done right away, such as "painting and plastering", but it seemed that there is a bureaucratic problem which prevents such action, and Dr. Land wondered what was considered necessary to get the job done -- was it necessary to obtain a Presidential Executive Order to do these things? Mr. Helms commented that one of the USIB Security Committee's recommendations will call for putting the responsibility in the USIB and the agencies will look to the DCI for guidance in such matters. Dr. Baker said that all this seemed confusing because the individual agencies have responsibility in this field, and he wondered whether a mere change in organizational labels would provide the necessary coordination and action. Mr. Helms thought that one task is to get the agency heads to realize the importance of the problem of audiosurveillance countermeasures. Dr. Baker observed that there are already in existence NSC directives which emphasize the seriousness of the threat. Mr. Gray pointed out in this connection that the preliminary USIB damage assessment of the Moscow penetration reflects that in some quarters in the State Department there is the view that maybe it was a good thing if the Soviets did get our information on the theory that the Soviets were thereby convinced of the firm intentions back of U. S. policy pronouncements.

Chairman Clifford asked whether anyone in our Government had ever considered the idea of telling the USSR in direct terms

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that we want to build an Embassy in Moscow ourselves, so that we can be certain that there are no audiosurveillance systems installed in it. Mr. Helms said that this is one answer and should be tried, but right now there is a hassle about which agency should chair the proposed new USIB Committee to coordinate such matters. Mr. Brown of State said that consideration had been given in the past to the possible use of U. S. employees instead of local maintenance people. Granting this, Mr. Clifford repeated his inquiry as to whether the intelligence community had ever proposed that the U. S. adopt the policy of bluntly telling the Soviets that we want the right to build a microphone-free Embassy in Moscow. Mr. Helms knew of no such proposal having been made by the intelligence community, but he thought that this was a matter which the President's Board could deal with in a recommendation to the President. Mr. Coyne at this point read to the Board the text of Recommendation No. 16 which the Board had made in the Dunlap Case (adoption of a U. S. policy that the USSR not be permitted to build a new Embassy in Washington unless the U. S. is given comparable permission in Moscow), and the State Department's reply to the effect that the U. S. was committed to the USSR in writing to help the Soviets get a new Embassy in Washington, in return for the Soviet action a few years ago in refurbishing and making available the North Wing of the U. S. Embassy in Moscow (Mr. Coyne pointed out that it was in this same North Wing that a number of concealed microphone cable connections and antennae were found in the course of digging out the recently-discovered microphone system in the Embassy).

Chairman Clifford asked Mr. Helms to provide the Board at an early date with a list of protective actions which could be taken right now to increase defenses against audio penetrations of our posts abroad. Mr. Helms agreed to do so.

Messrs. Helms, Osborne, Brown, et al, departed the Board meeting at the conclusion of this agenda item.

Dr. Albert Wheelon, Deputy Director of CIA for Science and Technology, joined the Board meeting, accompanied by Mr. Stevens of CIA, to report to the Board on Soviet satellite reconnaissance operations directed against the U. S. Describing this as the Soviet COSMOS program, Dr. Wheelon said that of the total number of Soviet satellite shots (46 in all) 17 have been launched from Kapustin Yar. During the last three years 22 launchings have been made from Tyura Tam, and these were pretty clearly reconnaissance satellites. These carried 10,000-pound payloads in a photographic general search system like our CORONA. The camera weighs 2000 pounds. Four of the shots, however, were of the 15,000-pound payload variety, and are spotting systems like our GAMBIT. The repetition rate over U. S. targets is increasing. We are getting data on each mission,

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being supplied through Burundi and Brazzaville. The Congo situation could become dangerous to the U.S. position in African public opinion. Chinese Communist influence is persuasive, and several African countries will recognize Communist China and vote for its admission into the U.N. The Chicoms offered a Central African Republic \$4 million for diplomatic recognition, and got it.

With regard to the Cyprus situation, Mr. Cline noted that although fighting has stopped neither side is backing down. The Cypriot leader will not agree to the Turks' proposal to rotate 1/3 of their troops on Cyprus unless the Turk Cypriots withdraw from positions along the coast. The USSR wants an independent Cyprus with a Communist-influenced government. Nasser wants an independent Cyprus subject to Egyptian influence. In reply to a question from Mr. Coyne, Mr. Cline stated that the Navy SIGINT installation has been scaled down so as to be ready for quick evacuation. This cut-down in U.S. SIGINT coverage has been replaced somewhat by installations in some Middle East capital cities.

Concerning South Vietnam, Mr. Cline said that the past 60 days have witnessed increased weakening of the political fabric of the government of that country. Khanh's inability to meet challenges is apparent, and his authority has steadily eroded. Khanh is trying to build support from the young officers and Buddhists. (Mr. William Sullivan has just returned to the U.S. and says that the SVN people generally feel that the U.S. will pull out after the November elections). There is no change in the military situation, Mr. Cline said, but there is a creeping paralysis in the SVN army. The Viet Cong is shifting from terrorism and fighting to all-out political activity. In the USIB yesterday CIA expressed the view that there will be further political decay in SVN, increased friction with the U.S., and a petering out of the war effort.

In Cuba, there are signs that either the Soviets or Cubans will begin shooting at our U-2's after the November elections, and the "303 Committee" is studying courses of action which might be taken by the U.S. in such an event. One objective of the DCI's recent European trip was to emphasize to NATO commanders that U.S. U-2 missions over Cuba are not mere whimsy, but are necessary for intelligence coverage which cannot be provided by satellite overflights. 2

At 11:00 a.m., Mr. Cline left the Board meeting which was then joined by Under Secretary of the Air Force Brockway McMillan (Director of the NRO) accompanied by General Stewart the new Staff Director at the NRO (previously attached to the Air Force Systems Command and the Air Staff).

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At 3:00 p.m., the Board meeting was joined by the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, and Mr. Kirkpatrick of CIA, in order that the DCI might cover the items in which Board members had indicated an interest in discussing with Mr. McCone.

Mr. McCone first took up the September Tonkin Gulf incident, pointing out that he was out of the country when it occurred. Mr. McCone said that previously in a meeting with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the President, Mr. McCone had expressed the view that if the proposed De Soto patrol remained outside the 12-mile limit it would not be attacked by the North Vietnamese or Chicom. The DCI said that the night before he left for Europe he repeated this belief to the Secretary of Defense, pointing out to him the absence of military attack preparations and the lack of other indications of hostile intent. The DCI felt that there was no real intelligence requirement for the De Soto patrol which had in fact been proposed for the purpose of emphasizing freedom of the seas and our right to enter the Tonkin Gulf with U.S. vessels. At the time of the incident the DCI was in conference with a NATO officer in Europe; and he immediately put in a call to McGeorge Bundy on the KY-9 and offered to return to Washington, but was told not to do so because of the uncertainties as to the need for it. Mr. McCone pointed out to the Board that CIA's assessment in the Central Intelligence Bulletin on Saturday morning reflected that there was no evidence that Hanoi had ordered an attack on U.S. vessels but that North Vietnam naval units had been alerted to avoid acts of provocation and were concerned with defensive action only if fired upon.

Mr. McCone noted the Board's expression of interest in discussing a mechanism to improve current intelligence assessment and reporting of such incidents as the Tonkin Gulf episode. He said that he had found room for improvement in one area: certain NSA intercept messages had been passed back to the field stations for processing, and had been sent to the National Indications Center, but were not passed immediately and directly to the CIA for analysis. Mr. McCone said that he had since corrected this reporting procedure. In any case, when the NSA messages reached the NIC they were sent on to CIA without serious delay. However, Mr. McCone said, there developed a dangerous situation which the Board should look at, namely, the fact that top policy officials grabbed onto fragments of raw intelligence and made decisions before the information had been evaluated in the light of the total information available and relevant to the situation. Policy officials should make use of the evaluating machinery which is at hand.

Dr. Langer said he understood that there had been no inter-agency evaluation of the SIGINT messages in the Tonkin Gulf incident. Mr. McCone said that by the time the Central Intelligence Bulletin was ready for publication on Saturday morning there was no opportunity for complete interagency coordination of the

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evaluation which CIA had made of the situation. Dr. Langer wondered whether there was sufficient DIA and State Department representation at the CIA center where the Central Intelligence Bulletin was prepared. Dr. Langer added that the White House staff followed the wrong procedure; that instead of querying CIA, Mr. Bromley Smith had called Mr. Coyne for help in getting a coordinated evaluation of the situation. Mr. Coyne corrected this by pointing out that in fact Mr. Smith had talked to State and others in the intelligence community; and thereafter called Mr. Coyne to obtain help in getting an up-to-date comprehensive summary of the SIGINT messages from NSA, and Mr. Coyne thereupon spent two days at NSA observing the work of NSA officials in reviewing and summarizing the messages which had come in from NSA field collection points, and the operational U.S. Navy messages to the extent that they had been made available to NSA.

Mr. Pace thought it strange that the availability of a channel to CIA had not been known to Mr. Bromley Smith, and Mr. McCone said that he too was surprised and intended to discuss this with McGeorge Bundy.

Turning to the subject of Cuba, Mr. McCone said that he had little to report in addition to that which he had reported to the Board at its meeting before last. CIA has 100 agents reporting on Cuba; they report comprehensively but under difficult circumstances requiring resort to clandestine radio equipment and secret writing reports through the mails. CIA has a reasonable number of sources (14) in the Cuban diplomatic corps, but Castro apparently doesn't have confidants among the Cuban diplomatic corps abroad. CIA has relations with friendly foreign diplomatic personnel inside Cuba. Mr. McCone said that he is not satisfied with the information being obtained from Cuba; the task is difficult; it is a matter of providing a negative. CIA has had to rely mainly on U-2 coverage results to check on the 45 reports received this year that there are Soviet missiles in Cuba. The SA-2 sites have probably been turned over to the Cubans by the Soviets, and a defector from an SA-2 crew has told CIA about Cuban operations. Castro has expressed intention to bring to the UN the matter of U.S. U-2's over Cuba, and has told Danish and Norwegian officials that after the U.S. elections in November, U.S. U-2's over Cuba will be shot down; Castro claiming that U.S. can rely on satellite photography of Cuba and must cease U-2 operations over the island. Mr. McCone said that by November 1, 1964, OXCART will be ready for missions over Cuba at a speed of Mach 2.8 and 80,000 foot altitude.

As for South Vietnam, the DCI said that it is most difficult to get intelligence on the Viet Cong. He has discussed with Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, and the CIA Station Chief in Saigon, how to improve this intelligence coverage. SVN intelligence organizations get very little information concerning the Viet Cong

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

September 24, 1964

SUMMARY

Recommendations Previously made by the Board
for Strengthening Capabilities of the U. S.
Intelligence Community in the Timely Analysis
and Reporting of Current Intelligence on
Developing Crisis Situations

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Board Report of July 2, 1961

Rec. #4: That the U. S. Intelligence Board create the means for assessing and reporting early warning indications of developing "cold war" crisis situations in any part of the world (such early warning to be handled separately from "hot war" indications dealt with in the National Indications Center of the U. S. Intelligence Board's Watch Committee).

Board Report of July 2, 1961

Rec. #1(7): That the DCI be responsible for (1) overseeing the preparation of national intelligence estimates by the intelligence community, (2) assuring the timely flow of intelligence to the White House, and (3) providing intelligence briefings to the President and other White House officials as required.

Board Report of January 11, 1962

Rec. #26: (Based on a review of the Berlin Wall and Syrian coup incidents): That (1) a sense of urgency be imparted at field and headquarters levels of U. S. intelligence agencies, with a view to ensuring timely reporting, dissemination and assessment of intelligence indicating the imminence of crisis situations which are of potential significance to the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States; (2) without imposing undue delay on the transmission of raw intelligence to Washington, State Department officials at overseas posts prepare periodic appraisals of developing crisis situations, for use at the field level and for consideration at Washington in the preparation of intelligence analyses and estimates; (3) procedures of the U. S. Intelligence Board, and its subsidiaries such as the Watch Committee, ensure that intelligence appraisals reflect significant differences of view which may develop in the intelligence estimative process; and (4) in keeping with the DCI's responsibility for the timely flow of intelligence to the White House, the DCI be requested to review arrangements and procedures to ensure that (a) CIA's intelligence assessments and spot reports on developing crisis situations are made available for timely consideration by the President and other officials, and (b) copies of assessments and spot reports to the White House from other agencies are furnished to the DCI for information and for use in preparing intelligence estimates.

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Board Report of January 20, 1962

Rec. #32: That the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the U. S. Intelligence Board, review the functions of the U. S. Intelligence Board's Watch Committee and National Indications Center, to determine their effectiveness in carrying out their mission of providing early warning.

Board Report of March 8, 1963

Rec. #49(11) (Based on the review of intelligence coverage, assessment and reporting by U. S. agencies with respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba in 1962): That concerted efforts be made to (1) devise an effective mechanism for the integrated assessment (and cumulative periodic appraisals) of early-warning and indicator-type intelligence and prompt reporting thereof to policy-making and command officials; and (2) conduct intensified research concerning automatic data processing techniques to facilitate the review and assessment of the great volume of material dealt with in the United States intelligence community.

Related Board Recommendations Regarding Critical
Improved Communications Capability for the
Quick Transmittal of Vital Intelligence Data

Board Report of October 17, 1961

In lieu of a recommendation, this was a report to the President on progress achieved by the Defense Department in performing its share of the responsibility for the efficiency of the Critical Communications (CRITICOM) Network for the quick transmittal of vital early warning and other intelligence data from overseas posts to headquarters in Washington.

Board Report of January 20, 1962

Rec. #27(11) (Based on review of U. S. intelligence activities in seven Middle Eastern countries): That the Defense Department equip field elements of the Critical Communications (CRITICOMM) Network with capability for rapid communication of critical messages among major and subordinate military commands in the field.

- 2 -

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Board Report of October 5, 1962

Rec. #10 (Based on review of U. S. foreign intelligence activities in Southeast Asia and the Far East): that the Defense Intelligence Agency take action regarding the military Special Security Offices (SSO) Communications System for transmitting sensitive information with a view to: (1) consolidating parallel SSO networks running between Pacific military commands and Washington civilian officials, and (2) reorienting the SSO system to make it a primary service and support to Commands in the field and command (as distinguished from Service) elements in Washington.

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

NW 185

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
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Note: Distributed to members at meeting
by Mr. Sheldon

INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE / INFORMATION



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 27, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 226

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Directive Relating to Transmittal of Information
to the Watch Committee of the United States In-
telligence Board

I hereby approve the attached directive relating to the
transmittal of information by appropriate departments and agencies
of the Government to the Watch Committee of the United States
Intelligence Board.

Attachment

Above-referenced directive

~~SECRET~~

*Note: Distributed to members
at meeting by
Mr. Sheldon*

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Directive Relating to Transmittal of Information to the
Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for the purpose of providing necessary support to the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) in the accomplishment of its mission, all appropriate departments and agencies of the Government are authorized and directed by the President:

a. To make fully available to the Watch Committee of the USIB all information and intelligence of reasonable credibility pertinent to its mission and functions (as defined in DCID 1/5 (new series), attached hereto), without restriction because of source, policy or operational sensitivity.

b. To keep the Watch Committee of the USIB informed concerning significant diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by the U. S., approved for immediate implementation or in process of execution, which might bring about military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, thus endangering the security of the U. S. This information is for the explicit and express use of the Watch Committee and those members of the National Indications Center who need to know of it in order to perform their functions.

2. When, in the opinion of a department or agency, overriding considerations affecting the national security exist which justify an exception to a. or b. above, the decision as to withholding or delaying the transmission of the information to the Watch Committee shall be taken up with the Director of Central Intelligence and, if there is disagreement, referred to the President. In the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the matter shall be taken up by the Director thereof with the Attorney General who shall consult with the Director of Central Intelligence, and if there is disagreement the matter shall be referred to the President.

3. Under normal circumstances such data should be sent to the Director of the National Indications Center, Pentagon Building. When an item is considered of exceptional sensitivity, it should be addressed

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NW 186

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-2-

to the Chairman of the Watch Committee, in care of the Director,
National Indications Center.

Attachment

Copy of Director of Central
Intelligence Directive (DCID)
No. 1/5 (New Series).

Copy furnished: Each member of the United States
Intelligence Board.

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NW 88185

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